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Customers, Co-workers and Competition:
Employee Covenants in California after
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
by DAVID L. SIMSON*
1. Introduction
This Note addresses an open question in California employment
law-whether an employer can contractually prevent an employee
from soliciting former co-workers. This question is particularly
interesting because of employee turnover in California's high-
technology companies.' It is not unusual for a new start-up to have
several employees who worked together at a previous employer,
often recruited by a former co-worker.
California Business and Professions Code section 16600 declares
that any contract by which anyone is restrained from pursuing a
lawful profession or trade is void.2  Case law is well settled that
prohibitions on merely competing with a former employer or
soliciting the business of former customers without using trade secrets
or confidential information are unenforceable.3 But the sparse case
law addressing co-worker solicitation-principally 1985's Loral Corp.
v. Moyes-indicates that a restriction on recruiting or hiring
* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.S.
Computer Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. The
author would like to express his appreciation to Professor Charles Tait Graves of U.C.
Hastings College of the Law for his insight and advice on this Note.
1. For a lengthy discussion of the effects of California's legal regime on the Silicon
Valley economy, see Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 607-13 (1999).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2011).
3. See, e.g., Muggill v. Rueben H. Donnelly Corp, 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965)
("[Section 16600] invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee
from working for a competitor after completion of his employment... unless they are
necessary to protect the employer's trade secrets.") (citations omitted).
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employees of the former employer might be permitted . The 2008
California Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP calls this case law into question both in dicta casting doubts on
the judicially created trade secret "exception" to section 16600, and in
its holding that restraints on an employee are not valid simply by
virtue of being reasonable and narrowly tailored
In some of the earliest decisions involving section 16600's
predecessor-Civil Code section 1673-the California Supreme Court
held that the statute had replaced the common law rule of reason, and
that the statute did not permit even partial or limited restraints.6
During the second half of the twentieth century, jurisprudence
developed that contractual restraints on unlawful post-employment
activity were enforceable. This typically took the form of a specific
exception for use of trade secrets or confidential information, or
other forms of unfair competition. In some cases, courts relied on
section 16600 in situations where it arguably did not (or need not)
apply, such as deed-based restrictions in use of land,7 wholesale and
retail distributorship agreements,8 and manufacture of licensed
designs.9
As state claims involving section 16600 began to be raised more
frequently in the federal courts, California district courts and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to unify the sometimes
inconsistent mass of California state precedent. In doing so, they
arrived at the "narrow restraint doctrine"-that section 16600
permitted restraints on former employees if reasonable, carefully
limited and narrowly tailored. ' California state courts acknowledged
this interpretation, but generally declined to apply it, and in 2008 the
California Supreme Court explicitly rejected it."
Re-examining the rationale of Loral Corp. v. Moyes-the 1985
decision which upheld a co-worker non-solicitation covenant-shows
it to be at odds with subsequent decisions. The Loral court compared
4. 174 Cal. App. 3d 268,279 (1985).
5. 44 Cal. 4th 937, 955 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Augustine, 172 Cal. 285, 289 (1916); Morey v. Paladini,
187 Cal. 727, 738 (1922).
7. Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co, 213 Cal. App. 2d 188, 192-93 (1964).
8. Great Western Distillery Prods. v. John A. Wathen Distillery Co., 10 Cal. 2d 442,
446 (1937).
9. King v. Gerold, 109 Cal. App. 2d 316, 318 (1952).
10. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1999).
11. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 949 (2008).
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solicitation of employees to solicitation of customers, but allowed a
restriction on employee solicitation without any showing that trade
secrets or confidential information was involved, which was a
requirement for enjoining solicitation of customers. The Loral court
further reasoned that imposing a one-year restriction on soliciting
former employees was reasonable and placed only a small and limited
restraint on business-a rationale mirroring the federal narrow
restraint doctrine which was rejected in Edwards. In light of these
developments, Loral is probably no longer good law.
Solicitation of co-workers might still be unlawful in some
situations. For example, if soliciting a former co-worker involved the
use of trade secrets, was a breach of the duty of loyalty or fiduciary
duty, or constituted unfair competition, this would be independently
wrongful. An employer could attempt to define this conduct and
prohibit it in an employee covenant, but in practice drafting such an
agreement would be difficult, and attempting to enforce it would be
little more effective than bringing a cause of action directly for the
tortious conduct. Although the notion that employees' identities and
skills could be a protectable trade secret might be used as justification
for employee non-solicitation clauses, this argument is substantially
weakened by social and business networking sites such as
LinkedIn.com, where employees post their resumes and expertise,
often linked to company pages maintained by the employers
themselves. Despite this, an employee covenant remains valuable in
the broader trade secret context by helping to define the scope of the
employers' trade secrets and demonstrate measures to maintain their
secrecy.
II. The Problem
The provisions in employment agreements most commonly
contested under section 16600-outright non-competition, misuse of
trade secrets and confidential information, and solicitation of
customers-are addressed in a substantial body of case law. 2 But
very little case law directly addresses covenants prohibiting
solicitation of employees and former co-workers. For example, in a
1969 case, Buskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., a court found a provision
not to induce agents of a life insurance company to represent another
company "not such an inhibition upon a former employee's right to
12. See Thomas Weisel Partners LLC v. BNP Paribas, No. 07-6198 MHP, 2010 WL
546497, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010) (discussing various types of provisions in
employee covenants which implicate section 16600).
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engage in a trade, business, or profession as to be within the
proscription of section 16600."" However, the case most often cited
for authority is Loral Corp. v. Moyes from 1985, where an employee
non-solicitation clause was allowed, but constrained to a one-year
duration. 4 The Buskuhl and Loral courts evaluated employee non-
solicitation covenants by analogy to customer non-solicitation
agreements, and permitted the clauses because of their narrow
impact. But case law even at that time was fairly settled that
customer non-solicitation clauses were only valid to the extent they
protected trade secrets,' 5 and the California Supreme Court in
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP explicitly rejected the theory that a
post-employment restriction is acceptable if it is narrowly drawn.'6
Subsequent to Edwards, a court suggested that a contractual
restriction is valid only if the conduct would be independently
tortious." In light of these developments, the validity of employee
non-solicitation covenants is uncertain. Is the rationale underlying
precedent like Loral still solid? Are employee non-solicitation
agreements defensible on some other theory, such as enjoining an
independent tort? Even if allowed, what are the practical difficulties
with employee non-solicitation agreements in today's well-connected
society? And finally, given the hostility towards employee covenants
in California, are they more trouble than they are worth?
III. Loral Corp. v. Moyes and Employee
Non-Solicitation Covenants
The proposition that an employer may restrain a former
employee from soliciting former co-workers was largely established
by a 1985 case, Loral Corp. v. Moyes.'8 Moyes was a former officer
and director of a Loral subsidiary, who had signed an agreement to
not "now or in the future disrupt, damage, impair or interfere with
the business" of his former employer, by "interfering with or raiding
its employees, disrupting its relationships with customers, agents,
13. 271 Cal. App. 2d 514,522-23 (1969).
14. 174 Cal. App. 3d 268,279 (1985).
15. See, e.g., Muggill v. Rueben H. Donnelly Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965);
Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1425,1429 (2003).
16. 44 Cal. 4th 937, 955 (2008).
17. See Retirement Grp. v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1238 (2009) ("[C]onduct
is enjoinable ... because it is wrongful independent of any contractual undertaking.").
18. 174 Cal. App. 3d 268 (1985).
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representatives or vendors."' 9 After Moyes left Loral to become
president of a competitor, he recruited and hired several people away
from his former employer. 20  The California Court of Appeal
ultimately upheld the contract, but limited its enforcement to only
one year following Moyes departure.2
Commentators criticized Loral soon afterwards for basing its
decision in large part on distinctions between contractual restrictions
on "solicitation" versus "interference," without satisfactorily
explaining how they differ. Loral was also criticized for using non-
California cases, and applying precedent based on sections 16601 and
16602 (relating to sale of business or goodwill) which was inapplicable
in this post-employment covenant situation.23  In light of
developments in the twenty-five years since Loral was decided, two
additional aspects of the decision are questionable: first, the court's
analogy of employee solicitation to customer solicitation (while
sidestepping any requirement for protection of trade secrets), 24 and
second, the apparent decision to permit the restriction because of its
reasonableness, its allegedly narrow impact, and its court-imputed
one-year duration not present in the original contract.29
IV. Business and Professions Code Section 16600 and
Its Judicial Exceptions
To properly re-evaluate Loral and its holding on employee non-
solicitation agreements, it is necessary to review section 16600's
history and more recent statutory interpretations, not only in
California state courts, but also in the federal courts.
In 1872, California's legislature expressed a strong state policy in
favor of open competition and free trade in Civil Code section 1673.
The language of the statute dictates broad application: "Every
19. Id. at 274.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 279.
22. James H.A. Pooley, Restrictive Employee Covenants in California, 4 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251, 269 (1988).
23. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 267-68.
24. Id. at 279 ("This does not appear to be any more of a significant restraint on his
engaging in his profession, trade or business than a restraint on solicitation of customers or
on disclosure of confidential information.").
25. Id. ("[E]nforceability depends upon its reasonableness, evaluated in terms of the
employer, the employee, and the public.... [T]here is no statutory problem in applying it
to Moyes' conduct within a year of its execution.").
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contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind.., is to that extent void.
26
In early decisions, the California Supreme Court confirmed that
the legislature had abandoned the common law "rule of reason" in
this area. In 1892 in Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co.,27 the
court noted that the common rules allowing reasonably limited
restraints on trade had been "uncertain" and "perplexing" and were
now overruled by statute. In 1916 in Chamberlain v. Augustine" and
again in 1922 in Morey v. Paladini,' the court reiterated that the
statute was absolute, permitting no exceptions for partial or limited
restraints."
A. An Alternative Way to Classify Section 16600 Cases
Commentators and judges have classified cases applying section
16600 in a variety of sometimes inconsistent ways-narrow
exceptions, trade secret or confidential information exceptions,
exceptions as to property, geographic or temporal restriction, and so
on-basing the classification on the facts of the case, specifically the
nature of the contractual restriction.32 It is also useful to classify them
at a more abstract level relative to the text of the statute itself. First,
where section 16600 was inapplicable-that is, where there was no
applicable contract. Second, where there is a contract which involves
trade, but does not restrain a profession, trade or business. Third,
where there is a contract, but it does not restrain lawfully engaging in
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1673 (Deering 1924), repealed by ch. 526, § 2, 1941 Cal.
Stats.1847 and enacted as CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600, Act of May 31, 1941, ch. 526,
§ 1, 1941 Cal. Stats. 1834. Civil Code section 1673 was accompanied by sections 1674 and
1675, providing exceptions for persons selling the goodwill of a business, and partners
dissolving or dissociating from a partnership, which were contemporaneously repealed and
reenacted as Business and Professions Code sections 16601 and 16602.
27. 96 Cal. 510 (1892).
28. Id. at 513 ("The [common law] rule, however, was uncertain, and led to much
perplexing legislation; and the law upon the subject in this state is now declared in section
1673 of the Civil Code."); see also Bosley Med. Grp. v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 284,
288 (1984) (explaining that the rule of reasonableness in context of trade restraints was
rejected in California in 1872).
29. 172 Cal. 285 (1916).
30. 187 Cal. 727 (1922).
31. Id. at 738 ("The statute [Civ. Code, sec. 1673] makes no exception in favor of
contracts only in partial restraint of trade.") (citing Chamberlain, 172 Cal. 285 at 289).
32. For a history of the statute and a comprehensive list of cases, see Tait Graves,
Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: A Proposal for Harmonizing California's
Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, 2006 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1,5-7 (2006).
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a profession, trade or business. This last category is informed by the
notion that unlawful or tortious conduct is wrongful independent of
any contractual duty, and should not be excused because of an
unenforceable contract against it.3' As this Note focuses on employee
covenants, it is also important to analyze where precedent involving
section 16600 in a non-employment context is applied in a case which
concerns an employer-employee relationship. While this does not
necessarily render the precedent suspect, different and sometimes
conflicting public policy concerns are implicated-employee mobility
versus free trade versus fair competition, for example.
B. Restrictions Outside the Scope of Section 16600
In 1964 in Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.34 the Court of
Appeal appeared to permit a narrow exception to section 16600 for a
land-use condition. A deed contained a restriction that prohibited
using the land as a service station for a period of time, and appellants
argued it violated section 16600."5 The Court first concluded that the
deed restriction did not fall within section 16600 at all, because it was
not a personal covenant or contract as to the appellants, but a
restriction on the land they owned.36 This would have been sufficient
to dispense with the section 16600 issue, but with perhaps an
overabundance of judicial caution, the Court held alternatively that
the restriction would also not violate section 16600 because the
plaintiffs were barred from operating a service station "merely ... on
those premises and then only for a limited time."37 Although it is true
that the effect of the deed was to restrain the plaintiffs from engaging
in a specific trade in a specific location for a specific period of time
(which certainly sounds like a narrow restraint), this restraint did not
arise out of a contract within the ambit of section 16600. Despite this,
33. See Robert Hays, Unfair Competition - Another Decade, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 69
(1963) (employer can only restrain by contract conduct that would otherwise be
considered unfair competition). But see Kate O'Neill, 'Should I Stay Or Should I Go?'
Covenants Not to Compete In a Down Economy: A Proposal for Better Advocacy and
Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 83, 90 (2010) (arguing that a contract claim
is the cheapest, simplest and fastest way for employers to protect their interests, and thus
employers have incentive to use covenants wherever possible).
34. 213 Cal. App. 2d 188 (1964) (disapproved of by Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 950 n.5 (2008)).
35. Id. at 190.
36. Id.; see also L.A. Land & Water Co. v. Kane, 96 Cal. App. 418, 420 (1929) (noting
that restrictions on use of property are valid unless imposed for an unlawful purpose, such
as a monopoly).
37. See Boughton, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 193-94.
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and even though Boughton was not a decision in an employment
context, it was nonetheless used as authority for narrow restraints in
later decisions involving employer-employee agreements.3
C. Contracts Involving Trade, but Not Restraining It
In 1937 the California Supreme Court held, in Great Western
Distillery Products v. John A. Wathen Distillery Co.,39 that contracts
whose main purpose is to promote and increase business are not
invalid just because they might "in some theoretical way incidentally
and indirectly restrict trade., 40 The contract at issue, however, was a
type of exclusive distribution agreement between two businesses.
The court found that the intent of this contract was to promote and
increase trade benefiting both parties, rather than restrict trade to the
benefit of one and the detriment of the other.4' This case appears to
support the proposition that small or incidental (i.e., narrow)
restraints are permissible despite section 16600. However, underlying
the court's holding was the determination that the contract was not a
restraint of trade at all, rather than it being an exception to the
statute.42  This case was cited in Loral in support of "reasonably
limited restrictions" in an employment agreement even though, like
Boughton, it did not involve any sort of employer-employee
relationship.43
D. Contracts Restricting Unlawful Acts
In King v. Gerold,4 decided in 1952, the California Court of
Appeal appeared to permit a partial exception to section 16600 when
it allowed an agreement prohibiting manufacture of a licensed trailer
design after the license period expired.4 ' The court found that the
agreement barred manufacturing and selling only the licensed design,
38. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999);
Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1987);
Latona v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Scott v.
Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
39. 10 Cal. 2d 442 (1937).
40. Id. at 446.
41. Id. at 449-50.
42. Id. at 446 ("The contract does not restrain anyone from exercising a trade or
business of any kind within the purview of section 1673 of the Civil Code.").
43. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268,276 (1985).
44. 109 Cal. App. 2d 316 (1952).
45. Id. at 318-19.
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and did not prohibit carrying on an entire business or profession."
The court's reasoning might imply that the restraint on manufacturing
the trailer was permissible under section 16600 because it was merely
a narrow limitation.4 ' However, the plaintiff licensed the right to
manufacture and sell the trailer only for a limited time; once the
license expired there was no longer a right to do so."s Consequently,
manufacturing and selling the trailer (without the license) was
engaging in an unlawful profession, business or trade-entirely
outside the scope of 16600's protection.
E. The "Trade Secret Exception" as a Prohibition on Unlawful Trade
In 1913 the California Supreme Court noted that preventing
"unwarranted disclosure and unconscionable use of trade secrets"
(i.e., misappropriation) was so fundamental a part of every business
relationship that no contract was required to prohibit it. 9  The
corollary to this is that misusing or misappropriating trade secrets
cannot somehow become lawful simply because a contract not to do
so is unenforceable. Stated in the language of section 16600, misusing
trade secrets would not be lawfully engaging in one's profession,
trade or business; therefore a contract to that effect is valid.0
Once a court determines that at least part of a contract enjoins
misuse of trade secrets or confidential information, that portion tends
46. Id.
47. Like Boughton v. Socony, King v. Gerold was used to support decisions
articulating the narrow restraint doctrine, until the California Supreme Court disapproved
of it in Edwards. See, e.g., Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 817
F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the defendant in King was narrowly restrained
only from producing a particular licensed design, and but was free to produce other
models).
48. The King decision does not elaborate on the type of intellectual property covered
by the license, but describes respondent King as the "inventor and designer of a house
trailer." King, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 317. Nowhere does appellant Gerold appear to have
challenged the contract as void because the subject design was in the public domain, and
trade secrets are not mentioned anywhere in the decision. The license may have been
predicated on copyright, as the case predates federal copyright preemption (17 U.S.C.
§ 301 enacted in 1978). The decision also uses some copyright language, for example
noting that Gerold manufactured and sold "a trailer substantially similar to that designed"
by King. Id. at 317. But regardless of the basis, the court accepted that the trailer design
was licensable, and as such, manufacturing it without license would be unlawful. Id. at
319.
49. Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 99 (1913).
50. See, e.g., Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 638-41 (1958) (finding a
covenant not to compete with a former employer invalid under section 16600, and no
evidence showing independent misuse or misappropriation of trade secrets to otherwise
merit an injunction).
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to be upheld.51 For example, in 1958 in Gordon v. Landau, the
California Supreme Court held that a list of preferred customers is a
"valuable trade secret" and that a contract prohibiting a former
employee from using that list is valid and enforceable.52 In 1965 the
California Supreme Court, in Muggill v. Rueben H. Donnelly Corp.,
held emphatically that section 16600 invalidates non-competition
agreements or penalties such as forfeiture of retirement benefits for
competitive employment, unless necessary to protect trade secrets.
A federal court shortly afterwards in Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell
invalidated a post-employment invention assignment agreement to
the extent that the invention was not based on trade secrets."
Subsequently, courts consistently allowed contractual restrictions on
former employees when the court agreed that the restriction involved
trade secrets or confidential information, but, with a few notable
exceptions such as Loral, disallowed them where trade secrets were
not implicated.
51. The tests used to determine if trade secret are implicated have varied (and in
some instances the court was entirely conclusory). This Note does not consider whether
the courts' factual determinations were correct-but observes that courts generally
enforce any portion of a contract that in their opinion serves to protect secrets or
confidential information.
52. 49 Cal. 2d 690, 694 (1958). The Gordon Court did not apply a test for a trade
secret, such as whether the information was in the public domain or whether the plaintiff
took measures to maintain secrecy. Id. Instead, the court concluded that "[p]laintiffs'
preferred customers are a real asset to their business and the foundation upon which its
success, and indeed its survival, rests. It thus logically follows that a list of such customers
is a valuable trade secret." Id.
53. 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965).
54. 340 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1972). The decision in Armorlite Lens was not
based on California precedent from Muggill, but rather used the principles of Winston
Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965), to
determine that making use of the former employer's secrets and confidential activity
would be unlawful.
55. See, e.g., Golden State Linen Serv. Inc. v. Vidalin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-10 (1977)
(holding non-solicitation of former customers enforceable, but invalidating a broad
provision not to carry on a similar business); Gordon Termite Control v. Terrones, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 176, 178-79 (1978) (contracts not to compete are invalid except where necessary
to protect trade secrets); Moss, Adams & Co. v. Schilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 130 (1986)
("Antisolicitation covenants are void as unlawful business restraints except where their
enforcement is necessary to protect trade secrets."); John F. Matull & Assocs., Inc. v.
Cloutier, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 1054-55 (1987) (contract that prohibits using trade secrets
or confidential information from the former employer to compete with that employer is
valid, as such activity is unfair competition); Metro Traffic Control Inc. v. Shadow Traffic
Network, 22 Cal. App. 4th 853, 863-64 (1994) (covenants unenforceable as no trade
secrets existed).
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V. Section 16600 in the Federal Courts and the
Narrow Restraint Doctrine
Many cases involving section 16600 have been heard in the
federal courts, either because of diversity jurisdiction or because the
section 16600 claim is heard under pendent jurisdiction alongside
federal claims. Federal courts may hear an increasing number of
claims involving section 16600 due to the recent adoption of the
''nerve center test" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction in
Hertz Corp. v. Friend.6  Before Hertz Corp., a corporation
headquartered out-of-state bringing a state claim in federal court
risked dismissal (or remand to state court) if they did more business
in California than in any other state-a fair possibility given the size
of California's economy."
A. The Emergence of the Narrow Restraint Doctrine in the
Federal Courts
The narrow restraint doctrine in the federal courts can be seen as
an attempt to unify the sometimes inconsistent and contradictory
California state decisions (including those arguably decided wrongly)
under a single doctrinal umbrella. In doing so, the federal courts
arrived at a rubric: contracts in restraint of trade were allowed if they
were "carefully limited," "narrowly tailored," and did not preclude
access to a "substantial segment of the market. 5 8 But although the
restraints permitted by state courts could be described as narrow and
meeting these criteria as discussed above, their narrowness was not
the reason why they were allowed: They were outside the scope of
16600, or restrained only unlawful pursuit of a profession, business or
trade. The narrow restraint doctrine as expressed was also
uncomfortably close to the "rule of reason" which Civil Code section
1673 was enacted to abandon, and ran counter to the California
56. 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010) (overruling Ninth Circuit precedent that a
corporation's principal place of business was the state with the largest proportion of the
corporation's commercial activity).
57. See, e.g., Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir.
2001) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where a Nevada
corporation, which sued a California non-profit, was found to be a California citizen for
diversity purposes because the corporation's business activity in California substantially
predominated over that in any other state).
58. See Latona v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (discussing the "Narrow Restraint Exception" but rejecting the contract in question
as overbroad).
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Supreme Court's original holdings that section 1673 permitted no
partial restraints.
Initially, federal courts applying section 16600 or its predecessor
limited exceptions to trade secrets, and followed California
precedents. As early as 1924, the Ninth Circuit, in Davis v. Jointless
Fire Brick Co.,59 vacated part of an injunction that prevented the
appellant from selling a product that competed with his former
employer's products, but left intact prohibitions on using his former
employer's customer lists, interfering with existing contracts, or
misleading the public to think that he still represented his former
employer.6° In effect, the court voided the contract as a restraint of
trade, but enjoined independently tortious misappropriation of trade
secrets and unfair business practices. And in Armorlite Lens Co. v.
Campbell,6' the district court held that a one-year post-employment
invention assignment agreement was valid and enforceable only to
the extent of ideas and concepts based on the former employer's
trade secrets or confidential information.62 The court based its
decision in part on the Ninth Circuit decision in Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,63 which enforced a
one-year invention assignment provision for inventions based on
confidential information," despite the contract also having an invalid
61two-year non-competitive employment provision.
The narrow restraint doctrine may have first explicitly surfaced
in Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust,6 where the Ninth Circuit
allowed a restraint if it was "limited in nature and further[ed] sound
public policies. '' 67  Smith involved suspension of pension benefits
under a multi-employer pension plan if a retiree later returned to
work for any of the participating employers. 6' The Ninth Circuit
agreed that section 16600 did not apply, but remanded on Federal
59. 300 F. 1 (9th Cir. 1924).
60. Id. at 4-5.
61. 340 F. Supp. 273 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
62. Id. at 274-75.
63. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
64. Id. at 145.
65. Id. at 141.
66. 654 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 660.
68. Id. at 653.
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ERISA claims. 69 The court distinguished Muggill, asserting that the
contract in Muggill required an absolute forfeiture of benefits, and
the employer's underlying motivation was to limit business
competition by dissuading retirees from returning to work for
competitors. ° By contrast, the pension plan in Smith suspended
benefits only while the employee worked for any employer
contributing to the same union-administered pension plan.7 The
court concluded that it was "confident" that California courts would
not use section 16600 to void a suspension clause "limited in time and
scope," and which was part of a "collective bargaining agreement
implemented [to fairly allocate] retirement benefits [and] serve public
polic[y]."7 But as the dissent in Smith forcefully argued, the Smith
court improperly read limitations into section 16600 from the
California precedent: first, section 16600 does not require inhibition
of business competition, and second, the contract provision
invalidated in Muggill permitted not only absolute forfeiture, but also
suspension.73
In 1987, in Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University,74 the Ninth Circuit held that section 16600 only
applies if a person is completely restrained from practicing his
profession, trade, or business.3 In doing so, the court considered
recent California state court holdings that section 16600 bans "any
and all restraints" and found that the district court had incorrectly
imputed a reasonableness standard into section 16600.76 However,
the court then used Boughton, which dubiously applied section 16600
69. Id. at 659. This case is also notable and more complex because the time period at
issue spanned ERISA's implementation-the court had to consider the time period before
ERISA was implemented, as well as an intermediate period of time before certain ERISA
provisions took effect. In his dissent, Judge Tashima notes that the majority's dismissal of
section 16600 greatly simplified the analysis of what law governed during each of the three
time periods. Id. at 663-64 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 660-61.
72. Id. at 661.
73. Id. at 662 (Tashima, J., dissenting). According to Judge Tashima's dissent, any
state cause of action under section 16600 would now be preempted by ERISA. Id. at 663-
64. Note also that the contractual language providing for either suspension or termination
of benefits is not found in the California Supreme Court decision, but rather in the Court
of Appeal decision it reversed. See Muggill v. Rueben H. Donnelly Corp., 39 Cal. Rptr.
753, 754 (1964).
74. 817 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 503.
76. Id. at 502.
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to a deed restriction, as a springboard to find that California defines
"profession, business, or trade" narrowly, and remanded the case to
allow the plaintiff to show that he was completely restrained from
pursuing his narrowly-defined profession.7 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit inverted section 16600's precedents: whereas California courts
generally accepted the employee's own definition of his profession
and invalidated even partial restraints of it," Campbell now required
the employee to define his profession narrowly and show a total
restraint. The eventual outcome may be the same-a complete
restraint of a narrowly defined profession could restrain as much as a
limited restraint of a broadly defined profession-but Campbell's
reliance on Boughton to find that a complete restraint was required to
trigger section 16600 would gain a life of its own. 9
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the narrow restraint
doctrine in General Commercial Packaging, Inc. v. TPS Package
Engineering, Inc.,m' finding that a shipping contractor could
contractually prohibit a subcontractor from working directly with the
end customer, because the limitation applied only to that particular
customer, and not to the subcontractor's entire business.8'
General Commercial Packaging was a dispute between
businesses; the Ninth Circuit applied the narrow restraint doctrine to
an employment case two years later in International Business
Machines Corp. v. Bajorek.82 In Bajorek, a stock option plan provided
that purchases under the plan could be rescinded if the employee
worked for a competitor within six months of exercise." The Bajorek
court found, following Campbell and General Commercial Packaging,
that since the restriction was limited in both time and scope it was
77. Id. at 502-03.
78. See, e.g., Hunter v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. App. 2d 100, 114-15 (1939) (holding
that a clause providing that a company would not design or produce machines to make
Venetian blinds except for one particular party was an unlawful restraint under section
16600's predecessor).
79. See, e.g., Armed Forces Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cass Commc'ns, Inc., Nos. 93-56373,
94-55336, 1995 WL 398719, at *3 (9th Cir. July 5, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (finding a
covenant invalid under section 16600 because it had a substantial impact on plaintiff based
on her narrow definition of her profession, rather than only a partial impact based on
defendant's definition).
80. 126 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1997).
81. Id. at 1132-34.
82. 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 1035.
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narrow and therefore permissible. 4 Next, the court declined to apply
the California Supreme Court precedent in Muggill, which
invalidated an absolute loss of benefits, in favor of its own precedent
in Smith, which permitted a temporary suspension of benefits.5
At this point, the existence of the federal "narrow restraint
doctrine" in interpreting section 16600 was undisputed. But as the
Ninth Circuit had tacitly acknowledged, California courts did not
quite agree with their interpretation. Nor did other federal courts.
In a 2003 unpublished opinion, Budget Rent A Car Corp. v. G & M
Truck Rental, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois denied a motion for a temporary restraining order to enforce
a one-year, five-mile-radius non-competition agreement in
California.87 The court noted the Ninth Circuit precedent, including
"possible inconsistency with California law," and then determined
that the "covenant in this case would not likely be enforceable in
California. ""
B. The Demise of the Narrow Restraint Doctrine:
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
California courts acknowledged the narrow restraint doctrine but
declined to apply it,89 and in 2008 the California Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the doctrine in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP.9°
84. Id. at 1040-41. The court believed that Bajorek could have avoided the forfeiture
simply by not working for a competitor, but it's unlikely (at least in this author's opinion)
that it would have been possible to work in the computer industry in the 1990s and not
somehow be competing with IBM. Id.
85. Id. But in doing so, the court also appears to have applied a type of
reasonableness test: "It is one thing to tell a man that if he wants his pension, he cannot
ever work in his trade again, as in Muggill, and quite another to tell him that if he wants a
million dollars from his stock options, he has to refrain from going to work for a
competitor for six months." Id.
86. Id. The Bajorek court felt that because of the factual differences with Muggill, it
was bound to follow its own precedent. Id. at 1040 n.23 ("As a three-judge panel, we are
bound by our prior decisions interpreting state as well as federal law in the absence of
intervening controlling authority.") (citing F.D.I.C v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 535 (9th
Cir. 1992).
87. No. 03 C 2434, 2003 WL21501784 (N.D. I1. June 26, 2003).
88. Id. at *4.
89. See, e.g., Kolani v. Gluska, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402, 406 (1998) (agreeing that a
contractual clause was an outright prohibition on competition and not "narrowly
tailored"); D'Sa v. Playhut, 85 Cal. App. 4th 927, 934-35 (2000) (declining to construe a
covenant as a "narrow restraint" against disclosure of trade secrets); Thompson v. lmpaxx,
Inc. 113 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1428-29 (2003) (rejecting respondents' claim that a limited
restrictive covenant is allowed under section 16600).
90. 44 Cal. 4th 937 (2008).
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Edwards arose in the wake of the Enron scandal. As it wound down
its U.S. operations, accounting firm Arthur Andersen sold a portion
of its tax practice to a subsidiary of HSBC."1 An Andersen employee,
Raymond Edwards, refused to sign a "Termination of Non-compete
Agreement" which required him to indemnify Andersen from any
claims and indefinitely preserve confidential information and trade
secrets, but also released him from a non-competition agreement he
had signed when Andersen first hired him in 1997.92 Andersen then
terminated Edwards' employment and HSBC refused to hire him.'3
In Edwards' suit against Andersen, he alleged that the non-
competition agreement was invalid under section 16600. 9' The trial
court accepted the Ninth Circuit's narrow restraint doctrine,
concluding that the non-competition agreement did not violate
section 16600 because it was narrowly tailored and did not completely
deprive Edwards of the right to pursue his profession.9s
The Court of Appeal reversed, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed that portion of the opinion, finding that the text of
section 16600 is "unambiguous,' 6 and holding that "non-competition
agreements are invalid under section 16600 in California, even if
narrowly drawn, unless they fall within the applicable statutory
exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5." 7 The Edwards court
explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's narrow-restraint exception and
disapproved of the decisions in Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.
and King v. Gerold in the context of section 16600.98 But the holding
was limited by the facts of the case to restrictions on competition and
serving and soliciting customers of a former employer, so the court
did not reach other previously allowed "narrow restraints"-using the
former employer's trade secrets, and soliciting former coworkers. 99
91. Id. at 942.
92. Id. at 942-43. When hired, Edwards had agreed not to provide similar
professional services for or solicit clients of Andersen, or "solicit away" Andersen's
employees for a period of eighteen months after leaving. Id. at 942. The "Termination of
Non-compete" required indefinitely preserving (i.e., not disclosing) confidential
information and trade secrets. Id. at 943.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 944.
96. Id. at 950.
97. Id. at 955.
98. Id. at 948-50.
99. Id. at 946 n.4 ("We do not here address the applicability of the so-called trade
secret exception to section 16600... [or whether] the provision of the non-competition
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C. The "So-Called Trade Secret Exception" after Edwards
In referring to the "so-called" trade secret exception, the
California Supreme Court begs the obvious questions-is an
employment covenant agreeing not to use trade secrets actually an
exception to section 16600? If so, on what basis? And if not an
exception, what is it? Taking the Court at its literal word, there can
be no trade secret exception, as the statute is silent about trade
secrets.""' A more nuanced and useful answer is suggested by the
earlier proposition that section 16600 does not void a contract that
prohibits unlawful acts in pursuit of one's profession, trade or
business. Thus, if an act is independently tortious or wrongful,
whether for example under common law, misappropriation of trade
secrets under California's enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA),1  or unfair competition under section 17200, l02 an
employer may contractually prevent its employee from doing so
without running afoul of section 16600.
In practical terms, whether otherwise restrictive covenants
protecting trade secrets are upheld based on existing precedent or
whether they are recognized to be outside the ambit of 16600 because
of the wrongful nature of the prohibited conduct may not make a
significant difference. To enforce the covenant requires proof that
the former employee has breached it, which would, among other
things, require proof that the information at issue really was a trade
secret. 3 In effect, enforcing the contract would be very similar to
bringing a direct action for the underlying trade-secret-based wrong.
agreement prohibiting [Edwards] from recruiting Andersen's employees violated section
16600.").
100. Admittedly, section 16606 defines the customer list of a telephone answering
service as a trade secret, and section 16607 defines the list of customers (employers and
applicants) of an employment agency as a trade secret (cutting off liability as to a former
employee of an employment agency after one year). Any argument that these sections
affect section 16600 beyond their own narrow textual scope would likely be unpersuasive.
101. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (West 2011).
102. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2011).
103. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §3426,1(d) (defining trade secrets as deriving
independent economic value from not being generally known, and requiring reasonable
efforts to maintain secrecy).
104. For a thorough analysis of employee non-compete agreements in an Intellectual
Property and Trade Secret context, see Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-
Competition Covenant as a Category of Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI.
& TECH. L.J. 69 (2011).
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In 2009, the California Court of Appeal advanced a similar
approach in Retirement Group v. Galante,"'5 one of the first published
cases after Edwards. In Retirement Group, the Court of Appeal
analyzed Edwards and the line of trade secret cases and concluded
that section 16600 bars enforcement of contractual clauses related to
solicitation, but a court may nonetheless enjoin tortious conduct by a
former employee that violates either the UTSA or unfair competition
law."'6 As the Court explained, "the conduct is enjoinable not because
it falls within a judicially created 'exception' to section 16600's ban on
contractual non-solicitation clauses, but is instead enjoinable because
it is wrongful independent of any contractual undertaking."'0' One
interpretation of Retirement Group might be that the contract itself is
irrelevant, and that only the employee's actual conduct matters.
Other courts have agreed with Retirement Group, but no court has yet
expressed so aggressive an interpretation in its holding. For example,
in Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., the Court of Appeal agreed with
Retirement Group, stating in dicta that it doubted "the continuing
viability of the common law trade secret exception to covenants not
to compete.' '  But the Dowell court was able to base its holding on
the non-compete and non-solicitation clauses being "so broadly
worded as to restrain competition." "'
Subsequently, a federal court in Richmond Technologies, Inc. v.
Aumtech Business Solutions"' applied the reasoning of Retirement
Group and Dowell to find that non-solicitation and non-interference
provisions in a contract were "likely to be found unenforceable under
California law."" The restrictions in the non-disclosure agreement at
issue were "more broadly drafted than necessary to protect
[plaintiff's] trade secrets, and would have the effect of restraining
Defendants from pursuing their chosen business and professions if
enforced.""'  Even so, the court found that the plaintiff had
105. 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (2009).
106. Id. at 1238.
107. Id.
108. 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 577 (2009). The Court of Appeal in Dowell agreed with
Retirement Group that the trade secret exception was no longer viable, but found that the
clauses in the employee covenant were too broad. Id. at 579.
109. Id. The court also affirmed the trial court's refusal to narrow the clauses so as to
make them lawful, regardless of whether or not trade secrets existed. Id. at 579.
110. No. 11-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (slip opinion).
111. Id. at*18.
112. Id. The agreement was extremely broad, providing that the defendant would not
"directly or indirectly, initiate any contact or communication with, solicit or attempt to
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established serious questions going to the merits of its claims of unfair
competition and misappropriation of trade secrets."3 The court
issued a narrow temporary restraining order enjoining defendants
from activities that might involve plaintiff's trade secrets, but did not
mention the non-disclosure agreement, and did not enjoin defendants
from soliciting, recruiting or hiring any of plaintiff's employees."4
Significantly, in reaching this result, the court did not measure
defendants' actions against the letter of the agreement, but rather
considered whether defendant had access to plaintiff's protectable
trade secrets and whether defendant was using or misappropriating
these secrets. " 5
Given the increasing antagonism towards contractual restraints,
an employer may find it more straightforward to proceed directly
with a misappropriation claim, and avoid the distraction and
additional expense of defending the contract from charges of
invalidity under section 16600. Even under these circumstances, the
signed contract would still be valuable in supporting the trade secret
action by showing efforts to keep the information secret and
demonstrating that the employee not only knew the information was
a trade secret but also was aware of a duty to maintain its secrecy.16
A final rationale for proceeding only with a direct cause of action
despite having a wholly or partially enforceable contract is the shift in
court attitudes towards employee covenants. In earlier cases, courts
severed and ignored unenforceable provisions; later decisions show
less willingness to do so, a greater concern with the imbalance of
bargaining power between employer and employee and a recognition
of the chilling effect of anticompetitive provisions on employee
solicit the employee of, or enter into any agreement with any employee, consultant, sales
representative, or account manager" of plaintiff for a period of one year "unless such
person has ceased its [sic] relationship with [plaintiff] for a period of not less than six
months. The agreement contained a similar prohibition with respect to any "account,
acquiring bank, merchant, customer or vendor" of plaintiff. Id. at *15-16.
113. Id. at *21.
114. Id. at *23.
115. Id. at *19-20. Curiously, plaintiff had not actually asserted a claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, but rather asserted breach of contract, interference with
contract, and unfair competition. Id. at *3. To support a restraining order on those causes
of action, the court construed the non-compete clauses in the contract to bar only the use
of confidential information to the extent that information was a trade secret.
116. See Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 99 (1913) (existence of even
unenforceably broad contract nonetheless shows intent to forbear from inequitable acts);
Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1522 (1997) (labeling information "trade
secret" does not conclusively establish that it is a trade secret, but helps establish the value
of the information and that it might not be publicly available).
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mobility."7  Commentators have also suggested that employee
covenants not to compete should be evaluated based on the
bargaining process between employer and employee-and only rarely
will employees have sufficient bargaining power to properly negotiate
a non-competition agreement.' I
VI. Solicitation of Co-Workers after Edwards
After Edwards and Retirement Group, restrictions on customer
solicitation are permitted only to the extent they protect trade secrets,
and a restriction will not be upheld on the ground that it is narrow
and reasonable. These holdings substantially diminish Loral's value
as precedent, and a bare restriction on employee or co-worker
solicitation may be difficult to defend on any theory.
A. Re-visiting the Analysis of Loral Corp. v. Moyes
After a lengthy evaluation of prior cases involving customer
solicitation, the Court of Appeal in Loral concluded that a restriction
on soliciting former co-workers was no more "a significant restraint
on his engaging in his profession, trade or business than a restraint on
solicitation of customers.""'  Yet the Loral court failed to
acknowledge that in every cited case previous courts would not enjoin
the solicitation of customers unless that solicitation involved the use
of trade secrets or confidential information. More recent cases
addressing solicitation in any context continue to hold that anti-
solicitation covenants are void except to protect trade secrets.'20
There was no allegation in Loral that the hiring of co-workers made
117. See Hunter v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 36 Cal. App. 2d 100, 112 (1939)
(provisions not in restraint of trade may be enforced if severable); Buskuhl v. Family Life
Ins. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 514, 523 (1969) (affirming forfeiture of commissions per
employee covenant despite other unenforceable conditions). But see Kolani v. Gluska, 64
Cal. App. 4th 402, 407 (1998) (construing a covenant not to compete as a narrow bar
protecting trade secrets would undermine public policy because employees would likely
honor illegal clauses without challenging them); D'Sa v. Playhut, 85 Cal. App. 4th 927, 935
(2000) (holding that an employer may not require employees to sign agreement with
unenforceable provisions, even if severable because employees cannot be expected to
know their rights under section 16600).
118. See O'Neill, supra note 33, at 85-92.
119. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 279; see also supra notes 18-25 and
accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1429 (2003)
("Antisolicitation covenants are void as unlawful business restraints except where their
enforcement is necessary to protect trade secrets." (citing Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling,
179 Cal.App.3d 124,129 (1986))).
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use of trade secrets, perhaps making the implicit assumption that the
co-workers were themselves trade secrets. Setting aside this question
of whether soliciting employees might implicate trade secrets,' 2' the
decision in Loral appears to be based on an analysis very similar to
the reasoning that led to the federal narrow restraint doctrine.
First, Loral had cited Great Western Distillery Products22 for the
proposition that "reasonably limited restrictions which tend more to
promote than restrain trade" are valid.'23 The Loral court further
considered that enforcement of a restrictive covenant could be based
on its reasonableness, "evaluated in terms of the employer, the
employee and the public."'' 24 The court then determined that the
original agreement, which had unlimited duration, could be made
reasonable by applying it only "within a year of its execution.
121
Then, after limiting the restriction's duration to one year, the
court noted that the restriction had the "apparent impact of limiting
Moyes' business practices in a small way in order to promote [Loral's]
business.', 26 The court even reworded a line from Aetna v. West to
emphasize both the similarity to customer solicitation, and the limited
scope and impact of the restriction: "Equity will not enjoin a former
employee from receiving and considering applications from employees
of his former employer, even though the circumstances be such that
he should be enjoined from soliciting their applications.' 27
In light of Edwards, it is hard to argue that Loral remains good
law. Edwards left only two avenues for a coworker non-solicitation
agreement to be valid: first, statutory text, and second, protection of
121. See infra Part VI.C.
122. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. Great Western Distillery Products
concerned an exclusive distributor agreement between businesses, far removed from the
employee covenant at issue in Loral.
123. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 276.
124. [d. at 279.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 280. The Court of Appeal had applied a similar narrow-restraint, rule-of-
reason analysis to a covenant not to solicit employees in an earlier case, not cited in Loral.
In Buskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 514, 522-23 (1969), the court said of a
provision not to induce other insurance agents to leave the former employer, "That
provision is not such an inhibition upon a former employee's right to engage in a trade,
business, or profession as to be within the proscription of section 16600."
127. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 280 (emphasis added); cf Aetna Bldg. Maint.
Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 204 (1952) ("Equity will not enjoin a former employee from
receiving business from the customers of his former employer, even though the
circumstances be such that he should be prohibited from soliciting such business.")
(emphasis added).
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trade secrets. There is no statutory exception for soliciting former co-
workers, and the facts of Loral fail to show even allegations of trade
secret misuse.' 2 As the Loral court appeared swayed by the narrow
scope of the restriction, a line of reasoning Edwards explicitly
disapproved of, it is especially difficult to imagine that this aspect of
Loral has further precedential value.
B. A Covenant Not to Solicit Employees is Almost Always a Restraint
If the limited prior cases involving employee solicitation are no
longer good law, it is useful to evaluate a covenant not to solicit co-
workers from first principles to help determine if such a covenant
could ever be valid and enforceable.
Section 16600 prohibits restraints on engaging in a lawful
profession, business or trade. After Edwards any restraint is suspect,
no matter how narrow or inconsequential, and may render the
contract invalid. But if the contract does not actually restrain the
employee in any way, it would not be unlawful. Consider an
occupation where recruitment is not a job requirement, there is no
bonus or benefit gained by referring or recruiting former co-workers,
and no penalty for not doing so. In this admittedly narrow factual
situation, a non-solicitation agreement would arguably have no effect
on the employee, and therefore is not a restraint.
While this scenario might apply to low-level individual workers
in some contexts, it is unrealistic, especially in the technology
industry. Although it is unlikely that an employer would penalize an
employee for not referring or recruiting, many large corporations do
pay referral bonuses.129 And while such compensation is a bonus and
not part of normal wages, an employee who is unable to participate
has forgone potential compensation and therefore has been
effectively restrained. Even without any formal compensation or
recognition, an employee who is unable to approach former co-
workers may feel disadvantaged relative to coworkers who are not
similarly restrained.
Unfortunately for the employer, this scenario also does not apply
to the very situations where recruitment is a vital part of the job
responsibilities and where restraints would have the greatest
128. Not only was no misuse of trade secrets alleged in Loral, but no actual act of
"solicitation" was alleged either. See Pooley, supra note 22, at 266.
129. See, e.g., Employee Referral Bonus Jackpots: 15 Companies with Awesome New-
Hire Incentives, HR WORLD (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.hrworld.com/features/referral-
bonus-jackpot-031108.
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competitive impact. Recruiting and hiring is commonly part of the
job description of most managers. Employees at smaller companies,
especially startups, often play a much greater role in recruiting new
hires. A senior employee or manager leaving to start or head another
company will often be competing with the former employer, and
might hire multiple people away from the former employer, as seen in
Loral. 30
C. Soliciting Employees as Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Accepting that a covenant not to solicit is a restraint, could an
argument be made that it is enforceable because it prohibits an
independent wrong, such as misappropriation of trade secrets, breach
of fiduciary duty or unfair competition?
Edwards does not preclude a covenant that prohibits misuse of
trade secrets, and prior cases involving customer solicitation have
hinged on whether the customers' identities were trade secrets or
whether soliciting them required use of trade secrets.31  A covenant
prohibiting employee solicitation might survive section 16600 under
sufficiently similar circumstances.
However, no court has held that employees' identities and skills
are trade secrets. In Metro Traffic Control Inc. v. Shadow Traffic
Network the Court of Appeal found that an employer did not possess
a trade secret in its employees' knowledge, training, qualities and
capabilities. 32  Just as customers are not trade secrets when
discoverable in commercial directories,33  employee contact
information might also be publicly available." Even otherwise
confidential and secret information about employees-their salaries,
130. See Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 274 (finding that an employer allegedly spent
over $400,000 to replace employees hired away, and the business was impacted).
131. See, e.g., Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1521-22 (1997) (finding that
a customer's identity is not only a trade secret, but also their contact names, i.e., the
specific person to solicit business to the customer).
132. 22 Cal. App. 4th 853, 862-64 (1994).
133. See Aetna Bldg. Maint. Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 205 (1952) (holding that
customers are not trade secrets when they can easily be found in business directories).
134. See Eastridge Personnel of Las Vegas, Inc. v. Kim Du-Orpilla, No. 2:06-CV-
00776-KJD-PAL, 2008 WL 872905 at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2008) (dismissing trade secret
claims based on names, addresses, and phone numbers of employees and applicants
because the information is readily available from the California Department of Consumer
Affairs).
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for example-has not been found to be a trade secret.' 35 Of course,
the lack of holding that employee information is a trade secret does
not dissuade the attempt-a company has claimed a trade secret in
"the skill levels, experience, specialties, performance attributes,
compensation levels, and attitudes" of its employees.'36
In the age of internet social media however, the statutory tests
for trade secrecy appear to be an even higher bar to overcome with
respect to this sort of employee information. The Uniform Trade
Secret Act (UTSA) defines a trade secret as information that "(1)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to the public or to other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy." '37 Each prong of the definition poses problems
to the assertion that employee information is a trade secret. As a
threshold, the information must actually be secret. In the past, the
employees of a given business may not have been public knowledge.
But today, many companies and employees publicly identify
themselves and their relationship on business-oriented social media
sites such as LinkedIn or Spoke. Linkedln, for example, claims over
120 million individual members, '38 and over 2 million company pages,
ostensibly maintained by the company itself.'39 In turn, the company
pages include a link to profiles of the company's employees, which in
turn often include job descriptions and titles. For example, the
company page of Space Systems/Loral includes a link to over one
135. See GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. App.
4th 409, 428 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal. 4th 1140,
1154 (2004).
136. Brocade Commc'ns Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., No. 10-CV-03428-LHK, 2011
WL 1044899 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011) (slip opinion, granting in part and denying in part
motion to dismiss). The court found that, at least at the pleading stage, Brocade had
defined its trade secrets with sufficient particularity, and had alleged misappropriation of
them. Id. at *7. Typical of employer-employee disputes in Silicon Valley, this case
involves significantly more than just solicitation of former-workers. Id. at *2.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2011).
138. See About Us: LinkedIn Facts, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011) ("As of August 4, 2011, Linkedln operates the world's largest
professional network on the Internet with more than 120 million members in over 200
countries and territories.").
139. See About Us: Linkedin and Business, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about
(last visited Oct. 25, 2011) ("More than 2 million companies have Linkedln Company
Pages").
[Vol. 4:1
WINTER 2012] CUSTOMERS, CO-WORKERS AND COMPETITION 263
thousand of its employees.1 40 Not only is this information clearly not
secret, but its very existence would belie any claim of reasonable
measures to maintain its secrecy.
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for an employer to claim that the identities, job functions
and skills of its employees were a trade secret, and it would be a
losing proposition to argue that an employee non-solicitation clause
was necessary to protect them.
D. Soliciting Employees as a Breach of Loyalty or Fiduciary Duty
Many of the cases involving employee solicitation and hiring
away, especially where large numbers of employees left or damages
to the employer were substantial, involve managers, executives and
other highly-placed employees. The defendant in Loral was a
director and officer of the subsidiary.14  In another recent case
involving a mass hiring of employees to a competitor, the defendant
was a director of one of the plaintiff corporations.142 If the conduct in
soliciting or hiring away began before employment terminated, the
employee may have breached a fiduciary duty or duty of loyalty to
the former employer.
4 1
An employee covenant barring conduct which would be a breach
of fiduciary duty would probably be valid to that extent, on the theory
that it prohibits only unlawful acts and is not attempting to restrain by
contract any more than could be judicially enjoined. But it is unclear
how such a covenant would benefit the employer. The covenant
would have to be carefully worded so as not to be overbroad, and
even so would risk straining the initial employer-employee
relationship. At least in the case of a covenant to protect trade
secrets, the very existence of the contract helps demonstrate measures
to maintain secrecy. But there is no analogous requirement that a
fiduciary know the bounds of his duty before undertaking it, and an
employee's fiduciary duty may change over time depending on the
nature of his responsibilities. So while soliciting employees might be
independently actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty, attempting to
140. See Companies: Space Systems Loral, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/
company/space-systems-loral, (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (showing, on the date visited, a
link to over 1,300 employees of Space Systems/Loral).
141. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 274 (1985).
142. See Thomas Weisel Partners LLC v. BNP Paribas, No. C 07-6198 MHP, 2010 WL
1267744, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010).
143. See Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 332 (1966).
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save an earlier broad covenant not to solicit employees by a post-hoc
narrow construction as a covenant not to breach a fiduciary duty
would likely fail, just as courts refuse to construe as covenants not to
solicit customers as narrowly protective of trade secrets.1
E. Soliciting Employees as Unfair competition
Simply soliciting or hiring away an employee of a former
employer is not in and of itself actionable.' 4' But when soliciting and
hiring away accompanies other unlawful or wrongful conduct it may
support a cause of action, such as for unfair competition or
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.'46 As
with breach of fiduciary duty, an employee covenant carefully worded
to prohibit just this independently unlawful conduct, the contract
might survive a section 16600 challenge. However, claims of unfair
competition are often interwoven with claims for breaches of
fiduciary duty, interference with advantageous relations or
prospective economic advantage and even misappropriation of trade
secrets."'
To further complicate matters, agreements not to solicit former
co-workers, especially when the departing employee works for a
competitor, might themselves be viewed as anticompetitive, running
afoul not only of section 17200, but also of federal antitrust law. For
example, under pressure from the Justice Department, Adobe,
Apple, Intuit, Google, Intel, and Pixar agreed to abandon agreements
not to solicit each other's employees.' 4 The settlement "prohibits the
companies from entering, maintaining or enforcing any agreement
that in any way prevents any person from soliciting, cold calling,
144. See Thompson v. Impaxx, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1425,1431 (2003).
145. See Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1145 (2004) ("[O]ne commits no
actionable wrong by merely soliciting or hiring the at-will employee of another.").
146. Id. at 1152-53; see also Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 255 (1968)
(causes of action for unjustifiably interfering with relationship between and employer and
employee might include unfair competition, interference with advantageous relations,
contract interference, and inducing breach of contract).
147. See, e.g., Sci. of Skincare, LLC v. Phytoceuticals, Inc., No. CV 08-4470 ODW
(SSx), 2009 WL 2050042, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2009) (granting defendant employee
summary judgment as to misappropriation of trade secrets, but denying as to breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of non-disclosure agreement, interference with prospective
economic advantage, trade libel, defamation, and unfair competition).
148. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High
Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at http:l/www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/September/10-at-
1076.html.
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recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees."'49 An employee
covenant restraining someone from soliciting her former co-workers
would appear to violate this provision of the settlement.
Given this degree of complexity, drafting a defensible employee
covenant that covers the many possible permutations ahead of time
would be hard to justify, and as before, attempting to construe it after
the fact to narrowly cover only the allegedly unlawful conduct of the
former employee would likely fail.
VII. Conclusion
The decisions in Edwards and Retirement Group suggest the
following paradox: If the employee's conduct in pursuit of their
profession or occupation is lawful, contracts prohibiting it are void
and unenforceable. And if it is unlawful, courts should enjoin it
directly, rather than as a breach of contract. Taken together, this
implies that the contract was unnecessary to begin with. And if a
contract is poorly drafted so as to prohibit conduct which is not
unlawful, courts are less likely to reform the contract. So do
agreements attempting to delineate what an employee does post-
employment have value?
They likely still do. First, the contract can serve to remind the
employee of the need to protect the employer's trade secrets. Unless
the contract clearly attempts to prohibit use of non-secret or publicly
available information, this would be part of the employer's
reasonable attempts to maintain secrecy. And for employees who
have fiduciary or other duty, language in the employment agreement
spelling out the duty in more detail would not work to defeat it. Both
employer and employee benefit from a certain degree of certainty by
knowing at least the boundaries of agreed-upon conduct after the
employment ends. 50 From a practical perspective, employers should
also consider that the contract might not be enforced using California
law. Although California's interest in enforcing its employment laws
is strong, and often prevails in choice-of-law analysis, this is by no
means guaranteed. 1' And federal courts, especially outside
149. Id.
150. See Hays, supra note 33, at 69-70.
151. See, e.g., Aspect Software, Inc. v. Barnett, No. 11-10754-DJC, 2011 WL 211644, at
*4-9 (D. Mass. May 27, 2011) (applying Massachusetts law and issuing preliminary
injunction preventing employee from working for new employer in California for one
year); Ayco Co., L.P. v. Frisch, No. 1:11-CV-0580 (LEK/DRH), 2011 WL 2413516, at *6-
9 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011) (applying New York law and issuing preliminary injunction
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California, appear cautious in applying Edwards as California state
precedent, especially when there appears to be any uncertainty in the
way lower courts interpret it.
2
Notwithstanding any lingering confusion, after Edwards, courts
applying California law will be increasingly unlikely to uphold non-
competition agreements between employers and employees, unless
they proscribe only independently unlawful conduct. For example, a
contract concerning use of trade secrets should prohibit only conduct
that would be misappropriation or misuse under the UTSA. Even so,
courts will pay more attention to the actual conduct of the former
employee and enjoin it only if independently tortious, regardless of
whether it is prohibited by contractual language. A valid contract
prohibiting solicitation or recruitment of employees would be difficult
to draft since merely soliciting former employees is not itself wrongful
but requires a concomitant wrongful act to be unlawful. And since
courts will focus on the conduct rather than the contract, it may be
better to enjoin any wrongful solicitation directly, rather than by
contractual means.
that prevented California employees of a New York employer from taking new
employment for ninety days). The overriding factor in both Aspect and Ayco was that the
employers alleged misappropriation of trade secrets; this was sufficient to overcome the
employees' objections on section 16600 grounds, even though the contracts contained
clear employee non-solicitation clauses in Aspect or non-compete clauses in Ayco.
152. See, e.g., Optos Inc. v. Topcon Med. Sys., Inc., No. 10-12016-DJC, 2011 WL
841254, at *9-10 (D. Mass. Mar. 7, 2011) (expressing uncertainty whether the Edwards'
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